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How the Law Thinks: 
Constructivist Epistemology of Law
Gunther Teubner 
Bremen/F i renze
'Twas bryllig, and the slythy toves 
did gyre and gymble in t.lie wabe : 
all mimsy were the borogovos; 
and the mome raths out grabe."
American law professor commenting 





























































































European and American scholars of law and society apparently 
have problems in communicating with each other. To invoke 
Lewis Carroll's authority on a piece of legal theory 
indicates how serious the problems are. After all, traced to 
its true origins, "Jabberwocky", the famous "Stanza of Anglo- 
Saxon Poetry" (Carroll, 1855, 1871: 191), means "weeks of 
woe" in its original German version (Scott alias Chatterton, 
1872). And inextricably involved in the interpretation of 
the poetry is a certain Hermann von Schwindel...
This lack of mutual understanding is only a recent 
phenomenon. Communication was still easy when Merton's 
regime of middle-range theories was governing law and 
society. There was a consensus that from the patient 
observation of the real law in the real world, a body of non- 
speculative, non-metaphysical theories would evolve. And 
this consensus was reflected in a common, sober, 
professional, comprehensible language. However, with the 
return of Grand Theory, with the invasion of post­
structuralism, critical theory, se1f-referentia1ity and 
autopoiesis in the socio-legal world, the unified discourse 
of law and society is falling apart again into different 
cultural provinces. The deplorable result is a fragmentation 




























































































Obscurity of language, then, is the most common critical 
comment on those recent European theory-fashions be they of 
Parisian, Frankfurtian or Bielefeldian origin. The language 
is said to be overly complex, often incomprehensible, and to 
conceal usually trivialities behind a smoke-screen of trendy 
words like legal discourse, communicative rationality or 
legal autopoiesis.
Of course, bad translations play an unfortunate role in 
this exchange of ideas. And national cultural contexts are 
still today so diverse that the transplantation of a theory 
from one context to the other leads to a degree of 
incomprehensibility which can only be gradually reduced by 
careful explanation. And one should also concede that 
sometimes personal idiosyncracies of theorists render their 
texts needlessly difficult to understand. However, the core 
of the problem lies elsewhere. It is as question of whether 
the language is complex enough to match the complexity of the 
subject matter. The new theories on law claim to construct 
socio-legal realities that cannot be adequately expressed by 
ordinary language. For them, to give in to the demands of 
easy comprehensibility would be to compromise on the content 
of their message.




























































































autopoiesis, several authors are working on a new theory of 
the legal person (collective actor, corporate personality; 
of: Luhmann, 1784: 270ff.; Teubner, 1988a: 130ff.; 
Knyphausen, 1988: 120ff.; Vardaro, 1989; Mutter, 1989: ch. 4; 
Ladeur, 1989b). In their language, "... the social reality 
of a legal person is to be found in the collectivity: the 
socially binding self-description of an organized action 
system as a cyclical linkage of identity and action".
What? Wore Jabberwocky? Do organizations think? How can 
they have the capacity to describe themselves? Linkage of 
identity and action? All this sounds like those infamous 
mystifications of collectivities. Obviously, collectivities 
do not act, but only individuals, and it is nothing but 
individual actions that are aggregated into collective 
action. So why not go back to Max Weber's more sober and 
comprehensible formulation of the same subject matter: 
"These concepts of collective entitities... have a meaning in 
the minds of individual persons, partly as of something 
actually existing, partly as something with normative 
authority. This is true not only of judges and officials, 
but of ordinary private people as well. Actors thus in part 
orient their action to them, and in this role such ideas have 
a powerful, often a decisive, causal influence on the course 
of action of real individuals" (Weber 1978: 4).




























































































understand the words. The message, however, is lost. The 
novelty of the construction lies in the following issues 
which depart point by point From the world views invoked by 
ordinary language: (1) Organizations do not consist of human 
individuals as members, but of communications, more precisely
of decisions as their self-constituted elements; (2)
organizations do "think"; it is via internal communication
that they construct social realities of their own, quite
apart from the reality constructions of their individual
members; in short, organizations are epistemic subjects; (3)
organizations are not per se capable of collective action;
they transform themselves into collective actors by
communicatively constituting their identity; (4) the capacity 
for collective action emerges when organizations in their 
collective identity produce actions and vice versa 
organizational action produces their collective identity.
Obviously, these four issues suggest a social reality of the
legal person that lies far beyond the well-known territories
of fiction, group or entity theories of corporate personality
(for the ongoing discussion in terms of those classical 
theories, cf. Horwitz, 1985; Dan-Cohen, 1986; Schane, 1987; 
Roos, 1988).
This example should have made clear that the above mentioned 
communication problem is not due to obscurity in language but 




























































































construction of newly perceived social realities. This, at 
least, is what the following new theories on law -- post.- 
Struotura1ism, critical theory and autopoiesis -- have in 
common, It is true, Michel Foucault, Jurgen Habermas and 
Niklas Luhmann "gyre and gyinble in the wabe", but they do so 
because they imagine social realities the reconstruction of 
which clearly goes beyond the limits of ordinary language. 
What makes them seemingly incomprehensible is their radical 
departure from epistemological premises that are deeply 
embedded in contemporary thinking on law and society, 
particularly, from what Pizzorno (1989) polemically calls the 
reification of a "metafísica cuotidiana" -- epistemological 
realism and methodological individualism. Although 
poststructuralism, critical theory and the theory of 
autopoiesis develop quite different visions of modern law, 
they converge in their anti-realism and their anti- 
i nd i v i dua1i sm (1).
One should hasten to add that anti-real ism does not mean
1. Given the humanistic orientation of critical theory, 
it might sound strange to characterize this theory as anti- 
individualistic. However, we are not talking about moral- 
political options, but theory constructions. In a threefold 
sense, this theory is anti-individua1istic : (1) in its 
critique of methodological individualism in economic and 
rational actor theories, (2) in its replacement of 
monological theories of norm formation by dialogical ones, 
(3) in locating the discourse in the center of cognition, and 
not the classical epistemological subject (cf. "communicative 
versus subject-centered reason" in Habermas, 1987a: ch. 11; 
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reality of its own.
(2) It is not human individuals by their intentional actions 
that produce law as a cultural artefact. On the contrary, 
it Is law as a communicative process that by its legal 
operations produces human actors as semantic artifacts.
(3) Since modern society is characterized on the one side by 
a Fragmentation into different epist&mes, on the other side 
by their mutual interference, legal discourse is caught in an 
"epistemic trap". The simultaneous dependence on and 
independence from other social discourses is the reason why 
modern law is permanently oscillating between positions of 
epistemic autonomy and heteronomy.
"Social construction of reality" apparently has become, 
after Berger and Luckmann (1966), received wisdom in 
sociology (see, e.g., Bloor, 1976; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; 
Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Gilbert & Plulkay, 1984; Collins, 1985; 
Fuller, 1988). However, our three theses show that there is a 
more profound version of social epistemology than the usual 
understanding of how 'social institutions, scientific 
communities and laboratory cultures influence individual 
perception. There is more to social epistemology than the 
"interests" of social agents that are responsible for the 




























































































theories under consideration here -- poststructura1isni, 
critical theory and theory of autopoiesis -- have radicalized 
the notion OF the '’social” in social epistemology which is 
worthwhile being examined in our context of legal cognition. 
What is the precise meaning of the somewhat ambiguous 
statement that law constitutes an autonomous reality? 
Similarly, what is meant by saying that the individual is a 
mere construct of society and law? And, above all, how does 
the law ’’think”?
II. Discourse and Autopoiesis
"It is comforting, however, and a source of profound relief 
to think that man is only a recent invention, a figure not 
yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge, and 
that he will disappear again as soon as that knowledge has 
discovered a new form.”
It is not only law and economics that are irritated by Michel 
Foucault's anti-realist and anti-individua1ist provocation 
(1974: xxiii), but most strands of social theory that are 
influencing modern legal thought feel uncomfortable with 
poststructuralism's decentring of the subject. Under the 




























































































methodological individualism, Hayek (1948, 1973) and Popper 
(19 S3), the quasi-natural reality of individual human actors 
is assumed by contemporary economic and social theories, such 
as theories of micro-foundations (Weintraub, 1979; Nelson, 
19B4) and rational actor theories (Elster, 1983, 1985) which 
demand that any collective phenomenon be reduced to 
intentional actions of human individuals. In an analogous 
fashion, the reduction of social macro-phenomena to 
characteristics of individuals is quasi-axiomatic for 
sociological behaviorism (Homans, 1961). But also for 
sociological theories on law in the tradition of Max Weber's 
Interpretive sociology, the reality of the acting individual 
is a fundamental assumption. "After all, the actions of 
individuals form society" (Aubert, 1980: 119). And even 
eocial theorists pursuing structuralist and systemic 
approaches feel compelled to correct them with an infusion of 
individualism (e.g., Crozier and Friedberg, 1977; Giddens, 
1987: 98 ff.; for the legal system, Febbrajo, 1985: 136; 
Kerchove and Ost, 1988: 157ff.; Ost, 1988: 87).
And it is indicative of the epidemic character of the 
individual-as-reality-syndrome that even critical legal 
authors who are deeply influenced by Foucault's ideas and 
enthusiastically take over his political messages plainly 
refuse to draw the epistemological consequences. Duncan 



























































































518) reveals a highly individualist bias for the reflective 
legal subject and a of law's communicative aspects. Thus, 
QQnaentrating on the individual judge's reflections and 
strategic considerations, he is as far away from a discourse 
analysis as are his "liberal" adversaries. And Robert Gordon 
<1984: 1 1 7 f f . ) explicitly rejects the anti-individua1ist 
tendencies in structuralism and post-structural ism as 
undermining the humanistic intentions of critical legal 
thought (=*) .
What makes this combination of realism and individualism in 
contemporary legal thought so viable is not so much its 
inherent virtues but the lack of credible alternatives. The 
traditional alternatives, epistemological idealism and 
methodological collectivism, are seen as unattractive -- and 
rightly so. But is it true that the only available 
alternatives are those (Gordon, 1984: 117) that read "... as 
if these impersonal structures had a life of their own and 
human beings were enslaved to the needs of that life-cycle, 
building or demolishing as the World-Spirit might dictate"?
As I will discuss in the following pages, there are
- It is true, there are important exceptions among the 
critical scholars who develop serious alternatives to the 
prevailing individualism, above all Thomas Heller (1984, 1988) 
and David Kennedy (1985). But these exceptions confirm our rule: 
it is their language, even in their own intellectual circles, 




























































































alternatives to the prevailing realist and individualist 
modes of thinking. From the diffuse contemporary movement 
toward "social construction of reality" and "decentring of 
the subject", I would like to single out three theorists who 
have contributed to a more profound understanding of socio- 
legal epistemology and who represent at the same time the 
most important intellectual strands in Western Europe: Michel 
Foucault (post-structuralism), Jurgen Habermas (critical 
theory) and Niklas Luhmann (theory of autopoiesis)- What 
they have in common is to replace the autonomous individual, 
not with supra-individua1 entities, but with communicative 
processes. They differ, however, in their identification of 
the new cognizing unit. In Habermas' version of critical 
theory correspondence theories of truth are overturned by 
consensus theories and "intersubjectivity" takes the place of 
the epistemic subject. Foucault and Luhmann are even more 
radical in their disenchantment of the human individual. For 
Foucault, the human individual is nothing but an ephemeral 
construction of an historically contingent power/discourse 
constellation, which dictates the "epist&me" of a historical 
epoch. Luhmann completely separates psychic processes from 
social ones and perceives the human individual in society as 
a communicative artefact, as a product of self-observation of 





























































































III. JUrgen Habermas: Intersubjectivity and Consensus
To arrive at a legal epistemology that really deserves its 
name, three important changes in our perception of law and 
society have to be made: first, from realism to 
constructivism; second, from individual to social 
construction of reality; and third, from law as a rule system 
to law as an epistemic subject. While the first one leads to 
a certain modification of Kantian positions, the other two 
changes break new ground in social and legal theory. The 
second change reveals the social foundations of cognition in 
a more radical way than traditional sociology of knowledge 
ever has done, and the third one attributes to the 
discursive practices of law the production of an autonomous 
social reality.
In this reorientation of social and legal epistemology, 
Habermas's theory of communicative rationality (Habermas, 
1971a, 1971b, 1974, 1975, 1984, 1987a, 1987c, 1988) plays a 
prominent role. Habermas's key concept of "rational 
discourse" highlights the crucial role of procedure in 
empirical and normative cognition and at the same time his 
"universal pragmatics" takes account of the social dimension 





























































































Habermas rejects traditional correspondence theories of 
truth (from Aristotle to Tarski) according to Which 
statements are true if they correspond to an external 
reality. Instead, he follows a consensus theory of truth 
which declares as criterion of truth the "potential" 
consensus of all discourse participants (Habermas, 1971a: 
123, 1973: 211). This move, of course, creates the need to 
identify an independent criterion in order to distinguish 
true from false consensus. Going through a sequence of 
different criteria, Habermas finally finds it in the 
presupposition of an "ideal speech situation" which in itself 
is defined by certain formal and procedural characteristics 
(Habermas, 1984: ch. 3).
It is this procedura1 ization of the truth criterion which 
has rendered Habermas's discourse theory so important for law 
(see for example, Alexy, 1978: 219ff.; Gunther, 1988). It 
makes the theoretical-empirical discourse of the sciences 
directly comparable to the pract i ca1-normat i ve discourse in 
politics, morals and law: their validity claims depend on the 
correctness of procedure (Habermas, 1987a: ch.3). And it 
opens the way to a rethinking of the modernity of law in 
which Max Weber's thesis of the materialization of formal law 




























































































(Habermas, 1985: 215ff., 1987b: 1; Wietholter, 1985, 1986;
GÜnther, 19BB; Joerges, 1989; Ladeur, 1989a; Preuss, 1989).
Habermas'6 other main contribution to an epistemology of law 
is to talee account of the social element in empirical and 
normative cognition. His philosophy attributes "epistemic 
authority" no longer to the autonomous subject, but to the 
communicative community (Habermas, 1983: 26, 1988: 63ff.,
BO): While traditional epistemology situates cognition
exclusively in the consciousness of the (empirical or 
transcendental) subject, Habermas recognizes that cognition 
is basically a communicative process. "Intersubjectivity" 
talces the place of the Kantian epistemic subject. It is the 
authentic consensus of the communicative community and not 
the consciousness of the autonomous individual that 
determines truth In cognitive and normative issues. Thus, 
Kant's famous question: "What are the conditions for the
possibility of cognition?" is redirected from the conditions 
of consciousness to those of communication. And even 
transcendentalism becomes socialized: the new a priori is
represented by the "ideal speech situation,” the 
presupposition of which is a condition of the possibility of 
communication (Habermas, 1971b: 136; 1983: 53; 1984: ch.3).
However, the "a priori of the communicative community" 





























































































the great problems of this theory. With the apriorization of 
pertain features of communication, Habermas attempts to 
escape from the "paradoxes of self-reference" (Wormell, 1958; 
Quine, 1976; Krippendorff, 1984; Barwise and Etchemendy,
1987) that necessarily emerge from his hierarchy of
discursive justification. The core of Habermas's theory is
in the self-application of discursive practices: the
procedures of discourse can be justified only by discourse 
whose procedures in turn have to be justified by discourse
avoid infinite regression or 
resorts to communicative
transcendental ism.
(3 ). And in order to
circularity, Habermas
Closely related to the transcendenta1ist foundation of 
rational discourse are the ambiguities of "intersubjectivity" 
that represent the other principal unresolved problem in 
Habermas's epistemological account. What is meant: elements 
or relation? Consciousness or communication? Psychic or 
social processes? Habermas's epistemic subject oscillates 
between these two positions without ever finding its identity
3 . The problem of infinite regression/circu1arity in 
Habermas’s theory of discursive justification is perhaps most 
clearly expressed in Habermas, 1971b: 123 ff., and 1973, 255 ff. 
Any one of those independent criteria that are supposed to 
distinguish true from false consensus, to judge the competence of 
speakers, or to decide on the authenticity of their utterances, 
etc., has to be subjected to consensus again. And even the 
cognitive schemes that guide the universalization of needs within 
the discourse have to be examined in a meta-discourse that in its 




























































































in one world or the other (for the controversy on
jnteraubjeativity versus communication, see Habermas, 1987c, 
Qh:12, 19BB: 95FF.; Luhmann, 1986d: 41ff.) It seems as if
Habermas again attempts to avoid the paradoxes of self- 
reference In discourse, this time by changing the system 
reference, IF discourse can be founded on discourse only 
recursively, need it not then be founded on human
consc i ousness?
IV, nichel Foucault: Discourse and Epistémè
Foucault's ideas on discourse and power can be read as a 
radical IzatIon of Habermas's epistemological position. 
Indeed, Foucault directly attacks what we have just described 
as the main unresolved problems in Habermas's account: the 
foundation of discourse in a communicative a priori. and the 
ambiguous role of individual consciousness in 
intersubjectivity. Foucault's main contribution to a social 
epistemology is to liberate the core concept of "discourse" 
from any transcendental or psychic foundation. Of course, 
this does not save him from the traps of se1f-referentia1ity. 
Foucault's escape is at the same time the most famous and the 




























































































Foucault's starting point is constructivist: reality is not 
something external to cognition, but is constituted, 
"PQnstrunted" by cognition itself. However, in sharp 
contrast to the classical tradition, it is not the individual 
consciousness of the subject that constitutes reality. Nor is 
it intersubjectivity, as in Habermas' theory, the 
communicative result of interaction between human actors. 
Rather it is "discourse" -- an anonymous, impersonal, 
intention-free chain of linguistic events (Foucault, 1972: 
ch.2). One should hasten to add that this is not a 
structuralist position (see Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1902: 
44ff. ). Discourse in Foucault's account is much richer than 
the abstract orders of signs in structuralism. It is social 
practice, not social structure; it is paro1e , not 1angue• 
The basic elements of the discourse are not signs, but 
"énoncés", i.e. social usage of language that constructs 
reality. The task of discourse analysis does not consist , 
in Foucault's words, of "treating discourses as groups of 
signs (signifying elements referring to contents or 
representations) but as practices that systematically form 
the object of which they speak" (Foucault, 1972: 49). 
Discourse is both event and structure, "a stream of 
linguistic events in space and time as well as a highly 
selective organization of linguistic events" (Honneth, 1985: 
164). And it is this historically contingent social practice 




























































































historical epoch, that defines the conditions for the 
possibility of cognition, not in an atemporal universal 
manner, but temporally, concretely, locally (Foucault, 1974: 
eh,2,3,7, for the sciences, 1979 for law).
Such a radical social epistemology has no place for 
individual consciousness and the intentional actions of human 
subjects and no need for an a priori foundation. The human 
subject is no longer the author of the discourse. Just the 
opposite: the discourse produces the human subject as a 
semantic artefact (Foucault, 1974: ch. 9). At the same time, 
discourse formations are historically contingent, lacking any 
a priori foundation- Every society has its own order of 
truth, its own politics of truth.
Now, it would be a consequence of this way thinking that 
discourse formations, those highly autonomous social 
practices, would themselves produce the criteria for their 
own transformation. Dreyfus and Rabinow, for example, 
clearly see this necessary self-referent i ali ty as a condition 
for structural change of discourses: Since "... he is 
committed to the view that discursive practices are 
autonomous and determine their own context ... he must 
locate the productive power revealed by discursive practices 
in the regularities of these same practices. The result is 




























































































themselves" (1982: 84). Foucault, however, stops short of 
those paradoxes of self-reference- He withdraws from the 
necessary consequences of his own construct and introduces 
the concept of power in order to externalize self-referential 
relationships. In his later thinking, he gives up the idea 
of the autonomous discourse as the new epistemic subject and 
resorts to the ubiquity of power as a quasi-transcendental 
foundation of discursive practices (for a critique, see 
Honneth, 1985: 168ff.; Habermas, 1987c: ch.10>
V, Niklas Luhmann: Constructivism and Autopoi esi s
The paradoxes of self-refe: 
obstacle to the development 
epistemology. Habermas and 
contributions, but the radical 
seem to be blocked by 
(circularity, tautology, inf 
their specific versions of 
rational discourse be j ust i f i e< 
itself (Habermas)? How can ■ 
govern the epist&me of a 
transformed if not by those < 
(Foucault)? Both authors are <
ence seem to be the principal 
of an authentically social 
Foucault. have made Important 
consequences of their ideas 
self-referential structures 
nite regression, paradox) in 
discourse theory. How can
I, if not by rational discourse 
hose discourse formations that 
whole historical epoch be 
liscourse formations themselves 




























































































necessarily lead to paradox, but their solution is to avoid 
the paradox at any cost. Of course, in the end, the 
paradoxes of self-reference cannot be avoided, they simply 
reappear at the termination of their escape route. When 
Habermas finds the transcendental foundation of communication 
in the distinction between the ideal speech situation and 
real speech situations, is this distinction, then, in itself 
empirical or is it transcendental? Alternatively, when he 
reintroduces the subject to the discourse, the classical 
paradoxes of the self-reflecting subject are obviously bound 
to reappear. When Foucault identifies the foundations of 
discourse in ubiquitous power-constellations he does so at 
the price of the self-referential paradoxes of power-
The theory of autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1980; von 
Förster, 1981; Luhmann, 1984) deals with these paradoxes of 
eelf-reference in a different way: Do not avoid paradoxes, 
but make productive use of them! If social discourses are 
autopoietic systems, i.e. systems that, recursively produce 
their own elements from the network of their elements, then 
they are founded on that very self-referentiality that 
Habermas and Foucault are desperately trying to avoid 
(Luhmann, 1986b: 172; 1986e: 129; 1988b: 153). As 
autopoietic systems, discourses cannot but find justification 
in their own circularity and cannot but produce regularities 




























































































of their own regularities. The paradox of self-reference 
then, is, not a flaw in our intellectual reconstruction of 
discourse which we have to avoid at all costs, but is its 
very reality which we cannot avoid at all. And the 
recursive application of operations to the results of these 
very operations does not necessarily lead to paradoxical 
blockage paradox or to sheer arbitrariness, but, under 
certain conditions, to the emergence of "eigenvalues" (von 
Förster, 1981: 274; 1985: 36). From continual recursive 
"computation of computation", social discourses "blindly" 
learn those, modes of operation that are valid in coping with 
their environment to which they have no direct access (for an 
elaboration of these somewhat jabberwocky remarks, see 
Teubner, 1989a).
The epistemological consequence is a radical constructivism 
(Piaget, 1971; Glasersfeld, 1975, 1981, 1985; Maturana & 
Varela, 1980; von Forster, 1981; Luhmann, 1984: 647ff.; Arbib 
& Hesse, 1986; Schmidt, 1987). Any cognition -- be it 
psychic or social, be it scientific, political, moral or 
legal cognition -- is a purely internal construction of the 
outside world; cognition has no access whatsoever to reality 
"out there". Any cognitive activity -- be it theory or 
empirical research -- is nothing but an internal construction 
by the cognizing unit; and every testing procedure that 




























































































against outside reality is only an internal comparison of 
different world constructions.
in this radicalised version of the "social construction of 
reality", there is no place for individual action and thought 
(for the relation of individual and social observation, cf- 
Luhmann, 1983: 1 ; 19B6a: 25; 1986c : 313). Social autopoiesis 
is exclusively based on communication -- defined as the 
synthesis of utterance, information and understanding -- that 
recursively reproduces communication (Luhmann, 1984: 193ff., 
1986b: 172 ff,). Social construction of reality is sharply 
separated from psychic construction of reality. Here lies 
the important difference from Habermas, who in the ambiguous 
concept of intersubjectivity blends communication and 
consciousness, and also from Foucault, for whom the subject 
is nothing but a historically contingent construct of 
shifting discourse/power constellations. For the theory of 
autopoiesis, psychic processes form a closed reproductive 
network of their own -- psychic autopoiesis -- accessible 
only to themselves and inaccessible to any communication. 
Communication in turn forms a closed autoreproductive network 
of its own -- social autopoiesis -- accessible only to 
communication and inaccessible to any psychic processes. 
Certainly, human individuals reappear in this world of 
communication, but only as communicative constructions, as 




























































































consciousness, to the autopoietic processes in the psychic 
world (Luhmann, 1984: I58ff., 1986c: 313 ff.). Psychic and 
social processes do co-exist, they are "coupled'1 by 
synchronisation and co-evolution, but there is no overlap in 
their operations. There is nothing but a symmetry of reality 
constructions: psychic processes produce mental constructs of 
society, and social processes produce communicative 
constructs of the psyche.
In these two aspects -- radicalization of constructivism and 
de-individualization of discourse -- Luhmann is expanding on 
what Habermas and Foucault have developed in their versions 
of social epistemology. However, there is a third aspect in 
Luhmann1s theory of autopoiesis that clearly goes beyond 
discourse analysis in its Parisian or Frankfurtian version--
this is the view of modernity as an irreconcilable conflict 
of different "epist&mes" (Luhmann, 1988a: 335ff.). While 
Foucault sees in history the ruptures of discourse formations 
that dictate one paradigmatic society-wide "epist&me" for a 
certain historical epoch, and interprets the modern epoch as 
the governance of one pervasive "subjectivist" epist&me 
following the Kantian revolution (Foucault, 1974: ch. 9f.; 
1979: ch. 4), Luhmann views modernity as the fragmentation of 
society into a plurality of autonomous discourses, as the 
multiplication of "epist&mes" in society. The crucial 




























































































cognition. Society is seen as fragmented into a multiplicity 
of closed communicative networks. Each communicative network 
constructs a reality of its own that is, in principle, 
incompatible with the reality constructions of other 
networks, At the same time, there is a multiplication and 
fragmentation of individualities which corresponds to the 
multiplication and fragmentation of social discourses. On 
the basis of its specific code and programs, each specialized 
communicative network produces "persons" -- semantic 
artifacts of individual actors -- to which actions are 
attributed (Luhmann, 1984: 155ff.). The "Multiple Self" 
(Elster, 1986; Etzioni, 1989: 11ff.) is the product of the 
fragmentation of social discourses in modernity.
This fragmentation of society into different epist&mes is 
one of the strongest points in Luhmann1s theory -- and at the 
same time its "blind spot". The emphasis on fragmentation, 
differentiation, separation, closure and self-reference of 
social epist£mes creates problems, to say the least, as to 
how their interconnection, interference, openness and hetero­
reference can be theoretically reconstructed (for a more 
detailed critique, see Teubner, 1989b). Unlike Habermas and 
Foucault who, at any cost, try to avoid the traps of self­
reference, Luhmann courageously faces self-referential 
realities in law and society. He even declares law to be 




























































































But a theory that deals extensively with self-reference, may 
ultimately be caught in the self-created closure of self- 
referential constructions. And the obvious problem that 
autopoiesis theory has to face is how to deal with the 
interrelations of different autonomous epist&mes, their
conflicts, their incompatibilities, their interferences (for 
first steps in this direction, see Luhmann, 1988a, 1989). The
open questions for a theory of fragmented epist&mes are: Is
there something like an epistemic minimum in modern society 
that serves as a common base for the autonomization of social 
discourses? Does one find co-variation or even co-
evolutionary trends among autonomous social epist&mes? Or is 
the only way to connect them through the reconstruction of 
an epist&me within the framework of another epist£me? These 
questions will reappear when we examine in detail, on the 
basis of the foregoing discussion, how a constructivist 
epistemology of the law reconstructs legal cognition in its 
conflicts with other modes of cognition in society (see below 
VII. and VIII).
VI. Law -- an Epistemic Subject?
How does the law think? Hary Douglas, in a recent book, has 




























































































(1986). After an exciting flirtation with Emile Durkheim's 
"GOlleotive consciousness" and Ludwig Fleck's 
"Denkkollekt iv"r she finally finds her way back to good old 
individualism: Of course, it is the individual member of the 
institution that thinks. However, his/her thinking is 
influenced by institutional context. In this version of 
social epistemology, the social element is represented by 
socialization of the individual mind- That's it. 
Collectivism is banned and individualism happily survives 
after a healthy dose of socialization.
From our selective reconstruction of Habermas, Foucault and 
Luhmann on social epistemology, the picture changes 
dramatically. It is true that individual cognition is shaped 
by social institutions such as law, via socialization (and 
here constructivism would add that since there is no access 
from communication to consciousness, socialization can only 
be self-socialization). But this is only half the story. 
The other half is that institutions such as law do "think" 
independently from their members' minds. The law 
autonomously processes information, creates worlds of 
meaning, sets goals and purposes, produces reality 
constructions and defines normative expectations -- and all 
this quite apart from the world constructions in lawyers' 
minds. Such a constructivist legal epistemology is at the 




























































































no recourse to individual actors and intentions; at the same 
time, it does not presuppose the existence of a supra- 
individua1 collective entity, Denkkol1ekt i v . consc i ence 
col 1 ect i ve , World III, legal consc i ousness , We 1 t-ge i st - • ■
Law is communication and nothing but communication, By this 
very conceptualization it is possible to avoid the traps of 
methodological individualism that would define law as a set 
of rules constraining individual action and that, apart from 
the catch-all phrase of unintended consequences, has no tool 
with which to analyze of the autonomy of the social, not to 
speak of the "legal proprium" (Selznlck, 1968). At the same 
time it avoids the traps of collectivism that views law as a 
supra-individual subject and that cannot explain who is, in 
fact, acting in the name of the Weitgeist-
The precise construction is as follows (for an elaborate 
discussion of the characteristics of autopoietic law, see 
Teubner, 1988b, 1988c, 1989b). Law is defined as an 
autopoietic social system, i.e. a network of elementary 
operations that recursively reproduces elementary operations. 
The basic elements of this system are communications, not 
rules; law is not, like analytical-normativist legal theories 
have it, a system of rules. On the other hand, the 
sociological-realist definitions of law as a system of legal 




























































































because they see human actors as the basic elements of law 
And other social institutions. The self-reproductive 
character' of law as a social process becomes intelligible 
only if one chooses communications as the law’s basic 
elements. Law as an autopoietic social system is made up 
neither of rules nor of legal decision-makers, but of legal 
communications, defined as the synthesis of three meaning 
selections: utterance, information and understanding. These 
communications are interrelated to each other in a network of 
communications that produces nothing but communications. 
This is what is basically meant by autopoiesis: the self­
reproduction of a network of communicative operations by the 
recursive application of communications to the results of 
former communications. Law as a communicative network 
produces nothing but legal communications.
Legal communications are the cognitive instruments by which 
the law as social discourse is able to "see" the world. 
Legal communications cannot reach out into the real outside 
world, neither into nature nor into society. They can only 
communicate about nature and society. Any metaphor about 
their access to the real world is misplaced. They do not 
receive information from the outside world which they would 
filter and convert according to the needs of the legal 
process. There is no in-struction of the law by the outside




























































































the law. This is not to say that the law arbitrarily 
"invents” social reality. A constructivist perspective should 
not be confused with "methodological solipsism" (Fodor, 
1980)j it rather looks for a "middle path" between 
représentâtionalism and solipsism (Varela, 1984: 217). Legal
constructlvlam, then, presupposes the "existence" of an
environment for the 1 aw. The point is not a monado1ogical
isolation of the 1 aw but the autonomous construction of
legal models of reality under the impression of environmental 
perturbations. Legal order from social noise!
What about the world perceptions of lawyers and lay people? 
Is it not their aggregation that forms the collective world 
view of the law (cf. the actor-based objections against an 
autopoietic law by Febbrajo, 1985: 134 ff.; Kerchove and Ost, 
1988: 157ff.; and Ost, 1988: 87ff.)? Of course, the 
communicative process of law needs lawyers and lay people; it 
would not work without their intentions, strategies and 
actions. But their (subjective, internal, psychic) 
intentions never enter the (objective, external, social) 
communication of law. They only make up part of the psychic 
processes, accompanying the social process of law and co­
evolving with it. Law as a communicative process is not 
accessible to any of those accompanying psychic processes of 
lawyers and lay people, and, vice versa, it has no access to 




























































































(Kerchove and Ost, 1988: 159) under the pressure of which the 
ftammuniaative process of law builds up its own autonomous 
order and creates the world of legal meaning (cf. von 
Förster, 1981; Teubner, 1989b).
But does the law as a social process not constantly deal 
with real people? Is the law not driven by actual motives, 
strategies, actions of clients, professionals, judges and 
legislators? Does the law not constantly refer to mental 
states of real people, to their intentions, goals, consent, 
dissent, errors, negligence, mens rea? -- Obviously, the 
law does so. But the "persons" the law as a social process 
deals with are not real flesh-and-blood people, are not human 
beings with brains and minds, are not the above mentioned 
autopoietic psychic systems. They are mere constructs, 
semantic artifacts produced by the legal discourse itself. 
Mental states are "in reality (sic!) constructs of practical 
discourses, necessary for the formation of communicative 
circles, of discursive communities" (Pizzorno, 1989: 9).
As social constructs, they are 
communication, because law as a 
attribute communication to actors 
ones) in order to continue its self 
"actors" are only role-bundles, 
products of legal communication
indispensable to legal 
social process needs to 
(individual or collective 
reproduction. But these 
character-masks, internal 




























































































collective actors, see Teubner, 1988a: 133ff.). The densely 
populated world of legal persons, the plaintiffs and 
defendants, the judges and legislators, the parties to a 
contract, the corporations and the state, is an internal 
invention of the legal process- Not only the corporation, 
but any legal person -- be it collective or individual -- is 
nothing but that famous "artificial being, invisible, 
intangible, existing only in contemplation of law", 
discovered by Chief Justice Marshall in the celebrated case 
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518, 627 (1819).
So human actors have a "double identity" in the world of 
autopoiesis. While in their social existence, they are pale 
constructs of autopoietic social systems, among them the law; 
in their psychic existence, they are themselves vibrant 
autopoietic systems. It is plainly wrong to argue, as some 
critics do, that autopoiesis de-humanizes society 
(GrUnberger, 1987), has no place for actors and intentions 
(Schimank,1985: 421; Mayntz, 1986; Ost, 1988: 87ff.; 
Rottleuthner, 1988: 122), does not account for the 
individual as epistemic subject (Podak, 1984: 734; 
Frankenberg, 1987: 296). The point is not the individual 
subject withering away, but the multiplication of centers of 
cognition. Social discourses are the new epistemic subjects 
that compete with the consciousness of the individual. 




























































































multiplicity of social discourses, it takes part in 
"decantring the subject", i.e. moving the subject away from 
ita privileged position as the sole and ultimate center of 
cognition. To repeat, if we talk about human actors in the 
law we have to carefully distinguish between the autopoietic 
reproduction of human consciousness, i.e. the operative 
reality of psychic processes, and the autopoietic 
reproduction of the social life of law in which human actors 
are not elements but constructed social realities.
VII, The Epistemic Trap
While discourse analysis in the tradit i on of Foucau1t
tradition sees the modern epoch in the grip of one pervasive
"epistème" (Foucault, 1972: ch. 2; 1974: ch. 9) and views law
like other disciplines only as a particular expression of the 
power/knowledge complex (Foucault, 1979: ch. 4), autopoiesis 
theory characterizes modern society as fragmented into 
multiple autonomous "epist&mes" (Luhmann, 1988a: 335ff., 
1989). Autopoiesis, thus, throws modern legal discourse in 
an irreconcilable conflict between epistemic autonomy and 
heteronomy (for two types of cognitive conflict between 
social systems, see Teubner, 1989a, 1989b). The dynamics of 




























































































reality constructions of its own, but the very same dynamics 
make law dependent upon a multiplicity of competing 
autonomous "epist^mes".
The epistemio autonomy of law results from the fragmentation 
of modern society that drives the law into second order 
autopoiesis (for elaboration, see Deggau, 1988: 128; Heller, 
19BB: 2B3; Ladeur, 1988: 242; Teubner, 1988b: 217; 1988c: 
60): In the dynamics of social evolution, se1f-referential 
relations are multiplying within the legal process, 
culminating in a hypercyc1ical linkage of the law's 
components. The law becomes autonomous from general social 
communication. It develops into a closed communicative 
network that produces not only legal acts as its elements and 
legal rules as its structures, but legal constructions of 
reality as well. The autonomy of modern law refers primarily 
to its normative operations which become independent from 
moral and political normativity (cf. Mengoni, 1988: 15); and 
secondarily, autonomy refers to the law's cognitive 
operations that -- under the pressure of normative 
operations -- construct idiosyncratic images of reality and 
move them away from the world constructions of everyday life 
and from those of scientific discourse (for an elaboration on 
the "facts of law", see Nerhot, 1988).




























































































reality" as a movement from reality-dependent theory to 
t.hepry-dependent reality. In an autopoietic reformulation, 
one would describe this process as an autonomization of 
specialised social discourses in which reality constructions 
of general social communication are increasingly replaced by 
reality constructions of the specialized discourses. The 
legal discourse invents and deals with a juridical "hyper- 
reality" that has lost contact, with the realities of everyday 
life and at the same time superimposes new realitises to 
everyday life. It is an "efficacité quasi magique", as 
Bourdieu calls it, which law possesses in its practices of 
"world making" (Bourdieu, 1986: 13) "Institutional facts" 
such as corporate personality, contract, and the will, are 
only the tip of an iceberg of legal reality constructs 
drifting in an ocean of "brute facts" of diffuse social 
communication. Legal discourse increasingly modifies the 
meaning of everyday world constructions and in case of 
conflict replaces them by legal constructs.
From a constructivist perspective, there is no way to 
challenge the epistemic authority of law, neither by social 
realities themselves, nor by common sense, nor by 
scientifically controlled observation. A social epistemology 
on a constructivist basis can explain why law appears to be 
an "essentially se1f-va1idating discourse" which one should 




























































































other knowledge fields" (Cotterel1, 1986: 15). It is simply 
naive to invoke social "reality" itself against legal, 
conceptual ism, against the "heaven of legal concepts" 
(Jhering, 1 B84 ) or against the law's "transcendental 
nonsense" (Cohen, 1935). There is no direct cognitive access 
to reality. There are only competing discourses with 
different constructions of reality, and all that Jhering and 
Cohen have to offer is their own "transcendental nonsense" in 
a different "heaven of legal concepts". Is there any reason 
to believe that Freirecht. sociological jurisprudence or 
legal realism have made the legal discourse more realistic? 
Not at all. They have not moved legal concepts closer to 
social reality "out there". They have just replaced one 
conceptual jurisprudence with another conceptual 
jurisprudence. "Social interests", the atoms of realistic 
jurisprudence, are unreal fictions, artificial semantic 
products, just as much as the "legal subjects", the atoms of 
classical jurisprudence.
"Law and society", "law and economics" are not doing any 
better if they pretend to invoke the authority of controlled 
scientific observation against the lawyers' "mystifications" 
of the social world (see for example, Aubert, 1980: 117ff., 
1983: 98ff. ; Rot11euthner, 1980: 137ff. for sociology; Adams, 
1985 for economics). If epistemological constructivism does 





























































































of new facta" (Arbib
having privileged access to reality (Bloor, 1976; Barnes, 
1974, 1977), Science does not discover any outside facts, it
Science is in a literal sense constructive 
& Hesse, 1986: 10). Radical
constructivism maintains that "...science produces a 
construction of the world which is validated by its 
distinctions and not by the world as such. Thus, science 
cannot claim the authority to discover the only and the 
correct access to the real world and to communicate this to 
others" (Luhmann, 1988c: 2, 9). If we can believe
constructivist reconstructions of the scientific process, 
then the celebrated controlled experiment is not what it 
pretends to be, a test of an internal theory against external 
reality, but is a mere internal coherence test comparing two 
constructs that are produced according to different 
procedural requirements: the logic of theoretical reasoning
and the logic of the laboratory.
Social science theory, say, on the relation between 
organization and collective action is not in any way superior 
to legal doctrine on the relation between the corporation and 
legal personality; both are discursive artifacts the 
construction of which is not arbitrary, but rationally guided 
by specific codes and programs. Similarly, empirical facts, 





























































































that result from scientifically controlled inquiry are in no 
sense more "true" than legal facts about the violation of 
corporate duties Which are produced under the firm guidance 
of the rules of law of evidence- In both cases, rational 
procedures and conventions of factual inquiry lead to 
empirical statements about reality. They serve as "hard" 
evidence confirming or refuting "soft" claims based on 
theoretical speculations or on legal reasoning. And if these 
empirical facts conflict with each other -- which is not so
rare --then there is no superiority of scientific constructs
over legal constructs, as some sociologists would like to 
have it (Opp, 1973). Epistemic authority is claimed by both 
scientific discourse and legal discourse -- and rightly so. 
What a naive realism would call the observation of "facts" is 
in both cases the production of artifacts the truth of which 
Is guaranteed by formalized procedures of factual inquiry, 
procedures that differ considerably in law and science. 
These procedures in turn are conventions, not arbitrary ones 
but structural selections which reflect choices made in the 
history of scientific and legal discourse(-**■).
■* - Thus, the resulting relativism of different social 
discourses is not "anything goes" relativism. It is a relativism 
j that invites to "raise the status of the other 'mythologies' by a 
more careful investigation of their methodological and cognitive 
| credentials" and to examine "the various kinds of criteria of 
acceptability that apply to different kinds of constructed




























































































The epistemic authority of legal discourse is an undeniable 
Fact oF modernity, and we have found ways and means to cope 
with the Fact of multiple truths -- scientific truth, legal 
truth, political truth ... . Res judicata is the classical 
example of an institutionalized conflict between legal facts 
and scientific facts. Even if it can be proven with 
scientific evidence that a factual statement in a legal 
procedure was blatantly wrong, the factual statement of the 
court and, what is worse, its legal, economic and social 
consequences will not be reversed (apart from in very few, 
narrowly defined exceptions), if the procedural requirements 
are fulfilled and the appeal procedures exhausted. 
Obviously, scientific facts collide with legal facts, but we 
are used to living with this collision, rationalizing it by 
invoking higher values, like legal certainty, or appealing to 
the relativism of our cultural provinces.
However, things are not quite so easy. 14 i ndsche id' s 
notorious "lawyer as such", (1904: 101), who is entitled by 
the law of social differentiation not to be "concerned with 
ethical, political or economic considerations" is forced by 
the same law to give up the entitlement and to incorporate 
those non-legal considerations into his/her autonomous 
reasoning. This is what I would call the "epistemic trap" of 
modern law. Law is forced to produce an autonomous legal 




























































































conflicting realities produced by other discourses in 
society.
The underlying reason for this confusion is "interference", 
that is the mutual diffusion of law and other social 
discourses (of •. Mengoni , 1988: 23). This is one of the most 
challenging problems for autopoietics if this theory intends 
to avoid the fallacies of solipsism and monadism (see above 
V): Although the legal discourse is closed in its self­
reproduction and produces its own constructions of reality, 
it remains always social communication and uses the general 
social constructions of reality and influences general social 
communication by its specific world constructions- Any legal 
act is at the same time - uno actu - an event of general 
social communication. One and the same communicative event, 
then, is linked with two social discourses, the specialized 
institutionalized discourse of law and the diffuse and 
general social communication. Interference of law and other 
social discourses does not mean that they merge into a 
multidimensional super-discourse, nor does it imply that 
information is "exchanged" among them. Rather, information is 
constituted anew in each discourse and interference adds 
nothing but the simultaneity of two communicative events (for 
details, see Teubner, 1989a, 1989b). Thus, juridical
constructs are exposed to the constructs of other discourses 




























































































are exposed to a test 
Old fiction of a test
of "social coherence" that replaces the 
of correspondence with outside reality.
tn the world of non-legal communication, inevitably legal 
constructs lose in this epistemic competition. Here, science 
has the advantage of having specialized in procedures for 
pure1y cognitive operations, while law uses cognitive 
operations only secondarily and has, thus, shaped the 
procedures of cognition in a different institutional context. 
But what about the world of legal communication in court 
rooms, law offices and legislative chambers? Here, the 
legal discourse claims to be entitled to "enslave" cognitive 
operations according to normative context and institutional 
purpose. The "empirical" models of legal communication are 
in the firm grip of "strategic" and "operative" models (for 
an elaboration of the mutual constraints exerted among 
different internal models of the outside world, see Teubner, 
1982: 96 ff.). However, it is the institutional context of 
the legal process itself that produces an internal 
contradiction. While it requires idiosyncratic reality 
constructions through legal communication, it forces legal 
communication to re-construct the scientific constructs of 
reality and to expose -- even within the law's empire-­
juridical constructs to the "higher" authority of science in 




























































































procedures -- litigation as well as legislation and scholarly 
diaputes -- Forces legal discourse to examine any piece of 
new knowledge produced outside the legal world if only it is 
"relevant" to the law. Any practicing lawyer who does not 
challenge legal evidence in the light of a new scientific 
research method would act against his/her interests and 
violate his/her professional duties. In the legislative 
process, political opponents on, say, health-legislation will 
challenge legal measures once there is credible scientific 
evidence that the presupposed nexus between a disease and 
certain causal factors does not exist. And scholars in law 
and economics reap their highest reputational profits when 
they inform courts about their naive pre-scientific models of 
human behavior and propose scientifically proven 
alternat i ves.
The epistemic trap of modern law, therefore, produces a 
challenge of the first order to legal doctrine, legal theory 
and legal sociology. Relentlessly, legal doctrine -- through 
the mouths of judges and law professors -- comes up with 
positive proposals as to how to escape from the trap. 
Reflexively, legal theory helps to broaden the escape routes, 
generalizing particular solutions and importing supportive 
knowledge from other disciplines. And positive legal 
sociology zealously studies the correlations between those 




























































































it remains the 
"trash" those 
mere i X ess decerns 
old trap.
pri v i1ege of 
attempts, to 
tructive ana
critical socio-legal studies to 
demonstrate to lawyers in a 
ysis that they are still in the
VIII. Escape Routes
To renounce epistemic authority, at least partially, would 
be the easiest way for legal discourse to escape from these 
troubles. Indeed, Luhmann who probably underestimates the 
possibility of conflict in authority among social epi stemes. 
seems to favor this escape route when he discharges the law 
from re-examining everyday interpretations and scientific 
constructs, like "woman", "cylinder capacity", "inhabitant", 
"thallium". "Should questions such as whether women, etc., 
really exist arise, they can be turned aside or referred to 
philosophy" (Luhmann, 1988a: 340). Unfortunately, such a 
clean separation of social spaces does not exist. Moreover, 
with such a division of labor among social discourses one 
would not exploit the richness of the autopoiesis concept, 
and would have to face empirical counter-evidence. In the 
day-to-day practice of legal decision making, law Is 
constantly forced to decide autonomously on cognitive 




























































































scientific inquiry or of common sense. If the normative 
context of law requires cognitive statements on specific 
matters, then it is true that the law may start its 
operations with common sense understanding and with reference 
to science. But whenever in the legal process these 
cognitive statements become controversial -- and this is 
usually the case for the politically and legally ‘'hot" issues 
-- then law can no longer turn them aside or refer them to 
philosophy. Then, hie et nunc. the legal process must 
provide for procedures to settle these divergences, and must 
make a decision that is based on a legal determination of 
those questions, even if they are controversial or actually 
non-determinable in the sciences. More particularly, 
political and juridical conflicts in the environmental law 
area requiring much extra-legal scientific and technical 
expertise, show the great degree to which legal decisions 
have to be based on a specifically Juridical assessment of 
scientific controversies or have to be made without any 
guidance from scientific results (cf. for the German 
situation, Kitschelt, 1984; Wolf, 1986; Winter, 1987).
The other main escape 
is the integration of 
clearly separating the 
those of scientific
route from the law's epistemic trap
law and social sciences. Instead of
realms of j uridical cognition from
cogni t ion, the legal discourse is




























































































construct ions and permanently revise legal models of social 
reality according to the accumulation of knowledge in the 
social sciences-. From the times of Jhering, Geny and Pound 
to the most recent variations of the "law and ..." movements, 
this has been the most challenging intellectual adventure of 
modern legal thought.
What can legal epistemology learn from almost a hundred
years of exper i mentat i on with "law and soc i al sciences"?
Although social science th i nk i ng has been remarkably
successful i n influencing legal practice (see for example,
Cottere 11, 1984 : 253 ff.), the great expectations of legal
enlightenment raised in academia have been dashed in the 
courtrooms. Psychiatry, sociology, policy analysis, economic 
analysis have successfully entered the legal sphere, but the 
result is not a greater degree of isomorphy of law and social 
reality that would result in more rational legal policies. 
Rather, the social science enlightenment of law has resulted 
in unanticipated consequences -- the production of hybrid 
artifacts with ambiguous epistemic status and unknown social 
consequences.
"Interest analysis", for example, is a surprising success of 
the efforts of "sociological jurisprudence" to replace 




























































































recent analysis of the German and French practice in 
administrative law and its sophisticated interpretation, see 
t,ad6Urf 11FF,, 57FF.). Today, interest analysis 
practically dominates legal decision-making in the courts: 
the courts analyze legal conflicts in terms of underlying 
conflicting social interests and "balance" them against each 
other according to standards that they infer from legislat. ive 
goals expressed in a comparable context. But what is 
sociological about this type of sociological jurisprudence? 
No sociologist whatsoever would dare to follow lawyers in 
their attempts to conceptualize, operationalize and 
empirically identify those phenomena called "social 
interests" that figure prominently in legal decisions (e.g., 
the legal concerns of creditors, debtors, neighbors, 
corporations, regions, states), not to speak of the juridical 
methods of "balancing" them. There are just too many 
explicit ' and implicit normative assumptions based on a 
complex network of 1egal-doctrinal considerations that enter 
into legal interest analysis. Simply put, juridical interest 
analysis cannot be legitimated from the standpoint of 
sociological theories or methods. In practice, interest 
analysis is a new conceptual jurisprudence that originally 
was subsidized by social science constructs but has for a 
long time gained an autonomy of its own. It may very well 
be that "interest analysis" contains elements of a new legal 




























































































capacity, see Ladeur, 1984: 216ff.), but they are surely 
different from the original goals of sociological 
jurisprudence and they evolve by institutional 
experimentation, not by the incorporation of sociological 
knowledge.
"Policy analysis" tells a similar story. Basically, it is a 
method of decision-making inspired by the instrumental use of 
social science knowledge (for a recent statement, see Albert,
1936: 34 ff.). Define the goals consented upon in the 
political process, determine the factual conditions of the 
regulatory situation, choose among the regulatory instruments 
according to nomological knowledge about means-ends 
relations, take into account side-effects, and, if you can, 
learn from practice about unanticipated consequences and 
perverse effects! But what has legal practice made of this 
"rational jurisprudence"? The lawyers have simply shifted 
their scholastic methods of doctrinal reasoning from the 
level of rules to the level of "policies", purposes, goals 
and principles supplanting social science analysis by the 
obscure hermeneutics of "teleological" interpretation. Legal 
consequentialism has in practice become a caricature of a 
scientifically controlled, causal analysis supported by 
empirical evidence (in Germany cf. the lively debate on 
Folgenkontrolle. Luhmann, 1974; Rott1euthner, 1979; Liibbe- 




























































































legal rule or decision derived from legal doctrine, is in a 
circular fashion defined by legal doctrine itself. Thus, 
doctrine which originally was supposed to be controlled by 
its social consequences, now controls its social 
consequences. Moreover, the rational calculation of probable 
consequences of decision-making in practice turns out to be 
nothing but the common sense projection of judges- And 
consequentialism is taken seriously only on the level of 
rules and not on the level of individual decisions that are 
in practice never reversed if the calculation of consequences 
turns out to be wrong. Again, we are faced not with social 
science in law but with a new type of legal doctrine dealing 
with "policies" as the new legal artifacts that replace old- 
fashioned rights and duties.
One could continue with the "poverty of psychiatry". Is it 
conceivable, from the point of view of a positivist science, 
that a psychiatric expert give an opinion of how to 
distinguish, abstractly and/or concretely, between guilt and 
causality (see for example, Prins, 1980: ch. 2)? Although 
from a scientific standpoint, any notion of individual guilt 
is nothing but a "trans-scientific issue" -- that is 
questions of fact that can be stated in the language of 
science but are unanswerable by science (see Weinberg, 1972; 
Majone, 1979) -- forensic psychiatrists routinely give such 




























































































concepts of their discipline.
"Economic analysis of law" Is a more recent battlefield for
epistemic competition. It has still to be seen if economic
imperialism will prevail or if, vice versa, Juridical dogma
will colonize economic thought. Especially in the hands of 
economizing lawyers, analytical concepts of economics undergo 
a subtle (and often not so subtle) change into normative 
constructs that serve as cornerstones for legal-doctrinal 
edifices. If for example one examines the new legal economics 
literature on the firm as a network of contracts (e.g., 
Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Clark, 1985; 
Schanze, 1986, 1987; Roos, 1988), what is left from the 
methodological principles of economics, formulated by 
Williamson (1987): theoretical openness, readiness to learn 
from other fields of experience, refutability of implications 
and exposure to empirical falsification? Judge 
Easterbrook’s piece on "Corporations as Contracts" (1988) in 
any case is a prototype of ideological orthodoxy, doctrinal 
rigidity, and conceptual immunization against contradicting 
experience.
These polemical remarks should not be misunderstood. They 
are not meant to defend the purity of scholarly 
conceptualization against strategic misuse lawyers with 




























































































demonstrate that social science constructs are not only 
ormed or distorted, but constituted anew, if they are 
iHPurporAtod into legal discourse (®. They are not imported 
into the law bearing the label "made in science", but are re­
constructed within the closed operational network of legal 
communications that gives them a meaning quite different 
from that of the social sciences. It is not a question of the 
same thing being looked at from different angles,
appropriately to different disciplinary interests, methods, 
etc. (Aubert, 1980: 117ff., 1983: 98ff.; Rott1euthner, 1980:
137ff.). This would be to presuppose an underlying reality 
that is capable of unifying the diverse aspects stressed in 
different disciplines and of deciding between conflicting 
descriptions. Rather, the differences are to be found In the 
realities themselves that are produced by different
discourses and that can be neither unified nor reconciled.
Thus, the incorporation of social science knowledge is not 
really an escape from what we called the epistemic trap of 
modern law. It does not solve the conflict between juridical 
and scientific realities, but adds a new reality that is 
neither a purely juridical construction nor a purely 
scientific construction. The constructs of sociological
"Much depends on noticing that law's autonomy lies not in 
its freedom from being influenced by external causes and 
influences but in the way in which it incorporates and responds 




























































































jurisprudence, legal economics, "legal politology", etc- are 
hybrid creatures, produced in the legal process with borrowed 
authority from the social sciences. However, epistemic 
authority and responsibility are no longer with the social 
sciences but with the law. And their "truth", their social 
adequacy, their viability will be decided no longer in the 
process of" scientific inquiry but in the process of legal 
communication. For instance, certain psychoanalytic 
constructs, as well as fully deterministic models in 
psychology will never be viable constructs in a juridical 
world that is based upon assumptions of individual guilt and 
responsibility. Or to take another field, the relative 
success of legal economics compared to sociological 
jurisprudence has probably nothing to do with the intrinsic 
"scientific" values of the models involved, but with their 
structural affinity to traditional legal doctrine. If courts 
considering questions of, say, negligence, public policy, 
fairness or properties of the "reasonable man", resort to 
"social norms", a sociological conceptualization would 
require time, energy and money for extended empirical 
research while an economic conceptualization in terms of 
transaction costs requires an armchair ...
It would be wrong, however, to view the incorporation of 
social knowledge as "irrational". Given the inherent tension 




























































































of modern sciences, it seems quite rational for the law to 
attempt to make the legal reality constructs at least 
efompat ible with recent developments in the sciences. In this 
respect, law resembles religion (for a constructivist account 
of the conflict between science and religion, see Arbib & 
Hesse, 1956: I6ff, I97ff.). For legal dogma and theological 
dogma alike, It is advisable to keep the world of faith 
compatible with the world of scientific truth. However, 
there is more to the integration of law and social sciences 
than merely making contradictory world constructions 
compatible. The "law and ..." movement, it should be 
admitted, has benign effects for the decision-making quality 
of modern law in terms of justice and utility. The most 
recent results of the social sciences and the permanent 
challenge which they represent can serve as a "variety pool" 
for legal innovation. It is a tremendously rich source for 
an ongoing re-construction of the legal world, comparable 
only to the richness in what people find litigable and which 
creates legal conflicts. However, what happens to those 
constructs once they enter the legal scene is no longer in 
the hands of the social sciences. Selection and retention of 
these variations is the job of legal evolution.
There are indications today that this legal reconstruction 
of scientific knowledge, if carried too far, becomes risky in 




























































































Winter (1987) felt a growth in the "judges' anxiety" about 
technical risk; assessment and other legal incorporation of 
scientific findings together with a tendency to reduce the 
scope of legally relevant issues. This looks like a return 
to the first mentioned escape route in the permanent 
oscillation between epistemic autonomy and heteronomy. 
However, there are other attempts to cope with this 
situation, experimentation with a third solution, a kind of 
middle path between the two main escape routes. These more 
promising attempts can be summarized in the following 
formula. Law cannot take over full epistemic authority and 
responsibility for the reality constructions involved, but at 
the same time it does not totally delegate epistemic 
authority to other social discourses. Rather, as a 
precondition for the incorporation of social knowledge, the 
legal system defines certain fundamental requirements 
relating to procedure and methods of cognition.
An case in point is the decision of the German Supreme Court 
on co-determination in economic organizations 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht. BVerfGE 50, 290). For years, 
constitutional lawyers had judged the constitutionality of 
labor participation on the basis of its economic effects-- 
in terms of efficiency of the firm, performance of the West 
German economy, and its position in international 




























































































i.e. firms, employer associations, labor unions, government 
Arid pari lament, had prepared briefs legal reality 
construcitiana in their briefs with detailed scenarios about 
the socio-econornic consequences of co-determination, either 
with catastrophic or beneficial consequences whichever was 
appropriate to their position (see Badura et al., 1977: 
137ff. 246ff.; KUbler et al., 1978: 35ff., 99ff., 145ff., 
197ff.). In addition, economic and sociological experts had 
been mobilized on both sides. The court refused to take a 
substantive position on these scenarios about possible 
consequences and resorted to a "procedural" solution. Instead 
of confirming or rejecting reality constructions, the court 
allocated risks of information and risks of prediction among 
the collective actors involved, including the court itself, 
and created a new legal duty for the legislature: to reverse 
its decisions if the predictions on which they were based, 
should turn out to be wrong (for an in-depth analysis of such 
a "proceduralization" of institutional cognition, see 
WiethdIter, 1985, 1986, 1989; Flajone, 1979, 1989). In several 
more recent decisions this tendency has been strengthened: to 
abstain from a material construction of reality and to 
proceduralize the legal solution; to delegate epistemic 
authority to different collective actors, i.e. regulatory 
agencies, private firms, labor unions, research institutions, 
interest associations, governmental organizations, 




























































































prediction; to define procedures and methods; to decide which 
collective actor must bear the "burden of proof" for reality 
constructions; and to define responsibilities for failures in 
information and prediction (see for environmental law, 
BVerfGE 49, 89; for corporation law, BVerfGE 72, 155; for 
the law of property BVerfGE 74, 264).
To a certain degree, a constructivist perspective would 
favor such attempts to "proceduralize" the conflict between 
epistemic autonomy and heteronomy in modern law. Indeed, when 
correspondence theories of truth have to be replaced by 
consensus theories and coherence theories, when the authority 
of science is based only on its internal procedures of 
validation, when institutional contexts like the law are 
condemned to epistemic autonomy and cannot resort to external 
authorities, then practical and theoretical attention must 
focus on the procedures that dictate the premises, content 
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epistemological idealism, and anti-individualism does not 
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agenda of legal theory today. Rather, in the return of grand 
theory, epistemological realism is transformed into a new 
epistemological constructivism and the agents of 
methodological individualism are replaced by constructs such 
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